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This paper investigates differences in household production and consumption among small- and large-
scale irrigators to assess whether the scale of an irrigation project increases household welfare in Mali. 
Much of the evidence of the impact of irrigation does not use counterfactual analysis to estimate such 
impact or distinguish between the scale of the irrigation projects to be evaluated. In the dataset collected 
by the author, both a large-scale irrigation project and small-scale projects are used to construct 
counterfactual groups. Propensity score matching is used to estimate the average treatment effect on the 
treated for small and large irrigators relative to nonirrigators on agricultural production, agricultural 
income, and consumption per capita. Small-scale irrigation has a larger effect on agricultural production 
and agricultural income than large-scale irrigation, but large-scale irrigation has a larger effect on 
consumption per capita. This suggests that market integration and nonfarm externalities are important in 
realizing gains in agricultural surplus from irrigation. 




Financial support for the 2006 data collection was provided by the Projet du Développement de la Zone 
Lacustre–Phase II” of the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), the Programme Mali-
Nord (GTZ/KfW), the Strategies and Analysis for Growth and Access program (Cornell University and 
Clark Atlanta University), the Einaudi Center at Cornell University, and the International Food Policy 
Research Institute (IFPRI). Funding for data collection in 1997/98 rounds was provided by IFAD and 
U.S. Agency for International Development/Mali. These data could not have been collected without the 
substantial assistance of Karin Dillon (2006), Sidi Guindo (1997/98), Abdourhamane Maiga (1997/98, 
2006), Nouhou Idrissa Maiga, Mamadou Nadio, a dedicated team of survey enumerators, and the helpful 
cooperation of the residents of the Zone Lacustre. The author gratefully acknowledges the valuable 
comments and suggestions from Christopher Barrett, Kaushik Basu, Daniel Gilligan, John Hoddinott, 
David Sahn, and Xiaobo Zhang on earlier versions of this paper during his dissertation as well as several 
anonymous reviewers. Rachel Gordon provided excellent research assistance. All errors remain the 
responsibility of the author. 
  
  1 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
Four percent of total cultivated area is under irrigation in Sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank 2007), which 
suggests the potential effect that increased irrigation investment may have on agricultural productivity 
and poverty by expanding the number of total irrigated hectares. However, irrigation projects are not all 
uniformly successful over the long term and differ along critical dimensions. One focus of debate is 
whether the scale of the project is correlated with higher productivity and poverty reduction. Lankford 
(2005) estimates that 44 percent of African irrigated systems comprise less than 100 hectares and 56 
percent take up more than 100 hectares, with increasing rates of investment since the 1980s being placed 
on increasing the number of small-scale irrigation projects. Lipton, Litchfield, and Faurès (2003) identify 
several mechanisms through which scale differences may affect farmers’ production and consumption. 
One such mechanism is increased market integration in both labor and input markets caused by 
economies of scale in larger projects relative to smaller projects. Another mechanism may be the 
increased spillover of agricultural knowledge or technology when a larger conglomerate of farmers forms 
in a particular location. Criticisms of large-scale projects as inefficient and wasteful have been countered 
by some evidence that despite inefficiency, large-scale projects increase food security (Attwood 2005). 
Smaller-scale irrigation projects may also afford benefits, especially with respect to efficiency. One of the 
largest costs of larger-scale interventions is the increased coordination costs of operation and 
maintenance, which pose governance and local capacity to be critical ingredients to success or failure. 
Farmers working in small irrigation systems may benefit from lower costs of participation as well as more 
influence over water management. Rosegrant and Perez (1997) argue in their review that farmer 
participation in the irrigation scheme’s design and management is a critical determinant of success, 
regardless of the scale of the project. 
This paper tries to quantify the differences in welfare between farmers that have access to large-
scale irrigation, access to small-scale irrigation, or no access to irrigation. We define “small scale” in our 
sample of village irrigation schemes as those that are 50 hectares or less, and we include a single large-
scale project of more than 300 hectares in the sample.
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Two primary identification problems exist for which the econometric strategy attempts to control 
in measuring the impact of irrigation. The first is the endogeneity of access to irrigation due to nonrandom 
program placement. This bias occurs when intentional or implicit targeting rules are used to allocate 
projects to villages. These village-level characteristics are likely to correlate with the explanatory 
variables if the programs are allocated either to highly productive areas to ensure program success or to 
less productive areas to target the poor. In either case, estimates of the project impact derived from 
outcome indicators will contain upward or downward bias, respectively, due to the group’s pretreatment 
characteristics. 
 Most studies of the impact of irrigation on poverty 
do not rely on matched treatment and comparison groups or randomized allocation of access to irrigation 
(see Hussain 2007b for a review), despite the likely correlation of irrigation project placement and farmer 
selection into programs with observable village and household characteristics, such as existing village 
infrastructure, market access, household education, and assets. Unobservable characteristics such as 
political influence or farmer ability may also be correlated with access and outcome variables. 
A second source of bias in program impact estimates is the selection bias due to nonmandatory 
program participation. Access to irrigation is likely to be correlated with household characteristics such as 
education, which may influence the likelihood of technology adoption or the ability of a farmer to lobby 
on behalf of his or her community for the program intervention and access to water, which is a necessary 
condition for motorized irrigation. Program placement is not random. Unless the allocation of program 
interventions was intentionally randomized or can be viewed as a natural experiment, the distribution of 
observable and unobservable village and household characteristics between treatment (with irrigation) 
and comparison groups (without irrigation) may not be statistically equivalent. 
                                                       
1 This irrigation scheme is one of the largest in Mali after the Office du Niger and a large scheme proximate to Tombouctou.  
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To quantify the impact of irrigation on household production and consumption, we use 
propensity-score-matching techniques to construct treatment and comparison groups because the data 
were not generated as a random experiment, drawing on a growing theoretical and empirical literature 
(Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd 1997; Dehejia and Wahba 2002; Jalan and Ravallion 2003; Bertrand, 
Duflo, and Mullainathan 2004; Smith and Todd 2005; Dehejia 2005; Gilligan and Hoddinott 2007). As a 
robustness check for the propensity score matching, four different estimators (nearest-neighbor matching, 
matching with 10 closest neighbors, kernel Epanechnikov, and local linear matching) are employed to 
produce point estimates. The paper cannot completely rule out whether unobservable characteristics are 
significant sources of bias. However, a rich set of observable household and village characteristics 
facilitates the construction of legitimate treatment and comparison groups and minimizes concerns with 
respect to selection on unobservables in the context of this study. Further, we estimate Rosenbaum 
bounds, which provide sensitivity analysis of our results to increased levels of unobservables on the 
statistical significance and confidence intervals associated with the key empirical results. 
We find that the impacts on agricultural production of the two types of irrigation systems are 
quite similar, but the effects of small-scale irrigation are larger on both production per hectare and 
agricultural incomes. The effects on consumption per capita are less clear. Pooled estimates for both types 
of irrigators yield statistically significant effects of irrigation on consumption per capita. However, 
estimates of the effects of large-scale irrigation are much larger than those for small-scale irrigation, 
despite the larger production effects of small-scale irrigators. This discrepancy could be explained by the 
effect of greater population densities at the large-scale irrigation scheme that generate positive 
externalities through increased nonfarm employment opportunities from irrigators’ investment of 
agricultural surplus or the potentially reduced costs of agricultural production from integrated input 
markets, which would increase farmers’ agricultural profits. 
The analysis in this paper is based on field research, which uses the author’s multi-topic 
household survey in northern Mali in 2006. Northern Mali is an arid area that possesses few of the 
preconditions for agricultural growth, such as good soil quality, frequent and adequate rainfall, moderate 
temperatures, and sufficient infrastructure. Most international attention has been paid to the Office du 
Niger irrigation scheme
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The second section of the paper describes the data and survey area, as well as describing 
differences in household and village characteristics for irrigators and nonirrigators. The third section 
presents the econometric strategy to estimate the treatment effects using nonexperimental data. Section 4 
presents the estimates of the effects of irrigation on agricultural production and household consumption 
among households with access to large-scale irrigation, farmers with access to small-scale irrigation, and 
farmers with no access to irrigation. The last section concludes. 
 in the Segou region of Mali, located in central Mali. However, small-scale 
village-level projects (30–40 hectares) and larger-scale projects (300 hectares or larger) dot the Inner 
Niger Delta and areas north of Tombouctou into the Saharan Desert, which is one of the poorest regions 
of Mali and an area hardest hit by the Sahel droughts. The impacts of these two types of irrigation projects 
are compared in this paper. These irrigation projects are not investments by farmers in boreholes or wells 
for irrigating their personal fields; rather they are community-level investments that result from 
household, village, and international organization partnerships. In northern Mali, borehole or well 
investment by households is constrained not only by farmers’ credit constraints but primarily by the arid 
climate, which results in a low water table and increased difficulty in constructing wells. The types of 
irrigation projects considered in this paper are those that use motorized pumps to redistribute water from 
the Niger River throughout a small-scale, canal irrigation system installed as part of international donor–
financed projects. 
                                                       
2 The Office du Niger was originally constructed in 1932 as a gravity irrigation scheme during French colonialism. Although 
the scheme was widely regarded as a failure into the early 1970s, a restructuring of the Office du Niger from 1979 to 1996 has 
improved the technical efficiency of the institution and increased grain yields for farmers (Couture, Lavigne Delville, and Spinat 
2002).  
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2.  SURVEY AREA AND DATA DESCRIPTION 
The data used to conduct the analysis in this paper were collected as part of the Poverty and Food 
Security Household Survey in Northern Mali 2006 (Etude sur la Pauvreté et la Sécurité Alimentaire au 
Nord Mali 2006) conducted by the author. This multi-topic household survey was implemented to study 
household consumption and agricultural production decisions in northern Mali in the cercles (states) of 
Niafunke, Goundam, Dire, Tombouctou, Rharous, and Bourem. The dataset contains a cross-section of 
2,100 households.
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Agroecological conditions throughout most areas of northern Mali would not be favorable for 
agricultural production without the Niger River, which is the dominant ecological resource in the region. 
The Inner Niger Delta is a potentially productive agricultural area in which flooding from the Niger 
augments water levels in temporary and permanent lakes and ponds, as well as smaller streams and 
tributaries. Soil quality deteriorates rapidly as the distance from the river increases. Farmers harness water 
resources through motorized pump irrigation and the use of water-recession agriculture around the lakes 
and streams flooded by the Niger River itself, as its water levels decrease seasonally. Rainfed agriculture 
is also common, but subject to considerable climatic risk. The Saharan zone receives less than 150 
millimeters of rainfall per year. This varies starkly with the Sahelian zone, which receives 200–600 
millimeters per year, and the south of Mali, which can receive as much as 600–1,200 millimeters per year 
(Christiaensen 1998). 
 This paper uses exclusively a subsample of the cross-section of 651 agricultural 
households in the cercle of Niafunke, where both small- and large-scale projects are found. By restricting 
the analysis to this cercle, we are able to control for variation across cercles that may affect output and 
welfare levels of households. Further details related to the documentation of the survey design and 
implementation can be found in Dillon (2005). 
Table 1 illustrates the distribution of irrigation among agricultural households in Niafunke 
Cercle.
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In the survey area, access to irrigation is facilitated by an international organization that provides 
motorized pumps to villages at no charge or significantly discounted prices; those costs are then 
reimbursed over an extended period of time and with the condition that villages contribute labor for the 
construction of the irrigation infrastructure, undertake pump maintenance, and provide fuel for the 
pump’s operation. Irrigation is primarily used for rice cultivation, rather than sorghum or millet, two 
traditionally rainfed crops. Rice production that relies on irrigation is cropped once per agricultural cycle. 
Internationally, increased agricultural production from a dual cropping system is commonly cited as a 
benefit of irrigation. However, the arid context in northern Mali does not allow a second cropping season 
after rice cultivation. This is because temperatures in the dry season are high (in excess of 40º Celsius) 
and receding river levels make it impossible to provide the minimum water required for rice plants or 
 Fifty-two percent of the agricultural households in the subsample had access to irrigation. Small-
scale irrigation was the dominant type of irrigation, representing 43.5 percent of farmers; only 8.6 percent 
had access to large-scale irrigation. The reason for this difference is that small-scale irrigation 
interventions are much less expensive to build. There is one large-scale irrigation scheme in Niafunke 
Cercle, whereas many smaller-scale schemes have been installed in rural villages. Both large- and small-
scale systems are community-based with farmers playing an integral role on management committees, 
although governance in the large-scale scheme is heavily influenced by paid employees who manage day-
to-day maintenance and water distribution. Both large- and small-scale schemes also provide technical 
assistance and extension advice to farmers on the timing of planting and the proper application of 
fertilizers, among other subjects. 
                                                       
3 Dillon (2008) investigates the effects of small-scale irrigation on a subsample of the households from this cross-section, 
which were tracked from 1997.  
4 Households that responded that they did not plant any crops in the previous agricultural season are excluded from the 
analysis to ensure the quality of matches in creating treatment and comparison groups. Nonagricultural households engage in a 
variety of activities, including raising livestock, conducting commerce, and working in the public sector.  
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other cash crops. The benefits of irrigation in northern Mali are accrued through increased water supply 
and control during the primary agricultural season. 
Table 1. Distribution of irrigation among agricultural households in Niafunke Cercle, 2006 
Access to irrigation  N  Percentage 
None  312  47.9 
Any irrigation    52.1 
Small   283  43.5 
Large   56  8.6 
Number of households  651   
Data Source: Author’s calculations from the Poverty and Food Security Household Survey in Northern Mali, 2006. 
Note: Irrigation projects are classified as small when the total hectares per project are 50 hectares or less. The large irrigation 
scheme comprises more than 300 hectares in total size. 
Table 2 contains agricultural production, per capita household consumption, and agricultural 
income from crop production descriptive statistics. Agricultural households without irrigation cultivate 
2.4 hectares, on average, with production of 2,042 kilograms per hectare. Households without irrigation 
have annual consumption per capita
5 of 170,109 FCFA.
6
Table 3 investigates the household characteristics among nonirrigating and irrigating agricultural 
households. Household demographics, including age of the head of household, education levels, and 
household size and composition, are similar across nonirrigators, small-scale irrigators, and large-scale 
irrigators. Nonirrigators have lower levels of farm capital (25,346 FCFA) and durables (115,636 FCFA) 
than irrigators. Small-scale irrigators have slightly higher levels of farm capital (30,302 FCFA) relative to 
large-scale irrigators (27,640 FCFA), but much lower levels of durables (207,093 FCFA versus 257,224 
FCFA). Village characteristics of irrigators and nonirrigators, including distance to a road, illustrate 
differences across villages. Significant differences exist between irrigators and nonirrigators in road 
access. Noting those differences, we restrict matches to households in similar villages and with similar 
household characteristics, which improves the quality of the matches and increases the precision of 
impact estimates. In the next section, we describe how treatment and comparison groups are constructed 
by propensity score matching using these observable household and village characteristics. 
 In comparison, households employing small-
scale irrigation cultivate 2.85 hectares of which 1.04 hectares are rice crops, whereas large-scale irrigators 
cultivate rice almost exclusively on 0.63 hectares of land. Small-scale irrigators cultivate more hectares 
than large-scale irrigators, but their agricultural production is diversified among rainfed and irrigated 
systems. Large-scale irrigators farm entirely in the irrigated system. Because large-scale irrigators are 
located in more densely populated areas, additional nonfarm activities are available to them whose returns 
may be larger than additional cultivation in rainfed agriculture. Despite differences in land cultivated, 
production per hectare varies between small irrigators (4,496 kilograms/hectare) and large irrigators 
(3,819 kilograms/hectare), but it is much higher than nonirrigators’ production per hectare. Consumption 
per capita is also larger among irrigators than nonirrigators. However, higher production per hectare 
among small-scale irrigators has not increased their per capita consumption (201,930 FCFA) relative to 
large-scale irrigators (322,869 FCFA). Agricultural income is also included as an outcome variable as 
differences in the weight of crops produced across farms may bias estimates. When agricultural income is 
calculated, nonirrigating households have uniformly lower income levels (189,437 FCFA) than irrigating 
households. Compared with large-scale irrigators, small-scale irrigators report higher income levels with 
differences of approximately 60,000 FCFA, but the standard deviation of income for small irrigators is 
also greater than that of large-scale irrigators. 
                                                       
5 Total household consumption is the annualized household consumption aggregate calculated from men’s and women’s 
assets and nonfood and food expenditures following Deaton and Zaidi (2002) US$1 = 450 FCFA.  
6 FCFA is the unit of currency in Mali, the franc of the Communauté financière d’Afrique (CFA).  
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Table 2. Household descriptive statistics, by irrigation status in Niafunke Cercle, 2006 
  None  Small  Large 
Total household hectares   2.4  2.85  0.63 
  (4.1)  (9.79)  (.46) 
Total hectares of rice    1.04  0.63 
    (1.59)  (.46) 
Production (kilograms) per hectare  2,042  4,496  3,819 
  (3,208)  (3,210)  (1,751) 
Consumption per capita (FCFA)  170,109  201,930  322,869 
  (102,109)  (124,470)  (144,201) 
Agricultural income (all crops)  189,437  355,082  295,311 
   (223,587)  (239,382)  (186,942) 
Data source: Author’s calculations from the Poverty and Food Security Household Survey in Northern Mali, 2006. 
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses. Irrigation projects are classified as small when the total hectares per project are 50 
hectares or less. The large irrigation scheme comprises more than 300 hectares in total size.  
Table 3. Household and village characteristics, by irrigation status 
  None  Small  Large 
Household size  6.8  6.9  6.8 
  (3.8)  (4.1)  (2.7) 
Number of males > 17 in household  2.0  2.0  1.8 
  (1.2)  (1.5)  (.88) 
Number of females > 17 in household  1.9  2.2  1.9 
  (1.1)  (1.8)  (1.3) 
Number of children < 17 in household  3.0  2.7  3.1 
  (2.5)  (2.0)  (1.9) 
Age of household head  50.7  49.7  48.9 
  (38.5)  (14.1)  (14.7) 
Ethnicity (1 = Peulh)  0.23  0.11  0 
  (0.42)  (0.31)   
Head’s education (1 = any education)  .02  .05  0 
  (.12)  (.22)   
Spouse’s education (1 = any education)  .01  .02  0 
  (.10)  (.13)   
Farm capital (FCFA)  25,346  30,302  27,640 
  (27,996)  (31,502)  (23,036) 
Durables   115,636  207,093  257,224 
  (128,330)  (225,229)  (220,737) 
Road access       
Less than 1 kilometer  21.0  17.1  100 
Between 1 and 10 kilometers  50.8  30.0  0 
Between 11 and 20 kilometers  16.0  44.2  0 
Greater than 20 kilometers  12.2  8.7  0 
Data source:  Author’s calculations from the Poverty and Food Security Household Survey in Northern Mali, 2006 and IFPRI 
(1998). 
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses. Irrigation projects are classified as small when the total hectares per project are 50 
hectares or less. The large irrigation scheme comprises more than 300 hectares in total size.  
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3.  ESTIMATING TREATMENT EFFECTS USING NONEXPERIMENTAL DATA 
The Evaluation Problem 
To estimate the impact of irrigation, recognizing the problem of selection bias between treatment and 
comparison groups, one ideally wants to estimate Δ = Yt
1 − Yt
0, which is the difference of the outcome 
variable of interest at time t between a state where the household receives treatment and a state where the 
household does not receive treatment, denoted by the superscripts 1 and 0. The average treatment effect 
(ATE) is estimated such that ATE = E(Yt
1 – Yt
0). However, it is impossible to estimate Δ in this way 
because a household exists in one of two mutually exclusive states, either with access to irrigation or 
without irrigation. The evaluation problem is one of missing data, due to the impossibility of assigning 
households to both treatment and control groups (Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd 1997; Dehejia and 
Wahba 2002; Smith and Todd 2005; Dehejia 2005). 
Randomized experiments enable the construction of the counterfactual E(Yt
0|X,T = 1) by 
randomly allocating treatment ensuring that E(Yt
0|X,T = 1) = E(Yt
0|X,T = 0). However, randomized 
experiments are not always possible or plausibly implemented to ensure the absence of selection bias. 
Hence, we estimate the average treatment effect on the treated households (ATT), given a vector 
household characteristic X: 
  ATT = E(Δ|X,T = 1) = E(Yt
1 – Yt
0|X,T = 1) = E(Yt
1|X,T = 1) – E(Yt
0|X,T = 1),  (1) 
where, because E(Yt
0|X,T = 1) is unobservable, it is assumed that E(Yt
0|X,T = 1) = E(Yt
0|X,T = 0). 
An important body of literature has tested the assumptions of nonexperimental estimators against 
experimental benchmarks and against each other to verify whether identification assumptions can be 
plausibly asserted (see, for example, Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd 1997; Dehejia and Wahba 2002; 
Smith and Todd 2005; Dehejia 2005; Diaz and Handa 2006). This literature has found that 
nonexperimental estimators can perform well if the set of observable characteristics is rich enough to 
create valid treatment and comparison groups. Critical to the assessment of impact assessment results for 
nonexperimental estimators is a series of robustness checks that we will describe below. First, we use 
different estimators to ensure that results are robust to the method of calculating the ATT. Second, we 
calculate Rosenbaum bounds, which provide some evidence regarding the assumptions implicit in 
equation (1) and the sensitivity of the results to unobservables. 
Propensity Score Matching 
To estimate the effects of irrigation, propensity scores are used to match households with similar 
observable characteristics, varying only the treatment, which in this case is access to irrigation. The 
propensity score is simply the probability that a household has access to the treatment, P(T = 1|X,V). 
Propensity scores are estimated using a probit model in which a vector of household characteristics X and 
village characteristics V is regressed on P, a household’s access to irrigation, to obtain predictions of 




v,h = βXv,h + γVv,h + εv,h.  (2) 
To estimate equation (2), household variables are used as controls, including household size, 
household assets such as household durables, age of the household head, an education indicator for the 
household head and his or her spouse, and farm capital. Village characteristics include indicators for 
distance to the nearest road in the commune of the observed household. 
The household and village variables used in the specification to generate the propensity scores are 
selected based on the inclusion of the largest set of variables that satisfies the balancing property, 
following Dehejia and Wahba (2002). That is, the treatment and comparison observations are tested to  
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ensure equality of observables across different propensity score groupings, so that there is an appropriate 
distribution of characteristics in each grouping of propensity scores. Estimates of impact are calculated 
over the common support of the distribution of propensity scores for irrigators and nonirrigators. The 
assumption that 0 < P(T = 1|X,V) < 1 is also satisfied in our sample, and the top and bottom 5 percent of 
the sample have been trimmed, following Smith and Todd (2005). 
Robustness Checks 
Four matching estimators are employed as robustness checks. The estimators are a single nearest-
neighbor matching estimator with replacement, a nearest-neighbor estimator using the 10 nearest 
neighbors with replacement, an Epanechnikov kernel matching estimator, and a local linear matching 
estimator. Both nearest-neighbor matching estimators are constructed with replacement of observations 
after they are matched. Replacement increases the quality of the matches by using more information to 
construct the counterfactual, but it increases the variance of the estimator by reducing the number of 
nonparticipant observations used in the comparison group. A nearest-neighbor estimator using 10 nearest 
neighbors with replacement increases the quality of matches but with the trade-off that the variance of the 
estimator is increased. 
The third estimator employed is the Epanechnikov kernel matching estimator for the average 
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∑
,  (3) 
where T is the treatment group, K is the kernel function, C is the comparison group, and an is the 
bandwidth parameter proposed in Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1997) and Heckman et al. (1998) for 
treatment observation i and control observation j. The advantage of this estimator is that it gives relatively 
higher weight to “closer” matches and lower weight to matches that are less close in the calculation of the 
average treatment effect on the treated. The last estimator is the local linear matching estimator, which is 
a generalized version of the kernel estimator. The advantage of the local linear matching estimator is that 
it is generally more robust to data design densities and has a faster rate of convergence at the boundary 
points (Smith and Todd 2005). 
The robustness checks ensure that results are insensitive to the estimator chosen, but it is possible, 
despite balancing propensity scores and ensuring that estimates are made on the common support of the 
distribution between treatment and comparison observations, that unobservables could bias impact 
estimates. Either individual unobservable heterogeneity such as farming ability or political influence 
could bias estimates based on selection of farmers into the irrigation scheme. Likewise, village 
unobservable heterogeneity such as land quality or organizational capacity to manage the irrigation 
scheme could bias impact estimates. Rosenbaum bounds (2002) were proposed to simulate the effect of 
unobserved heterogeneity on impact estimates. If the probability of participation is 
P(xi) = P(Ti = 1|xi) = F(βxi + γui), the likelihood of participation is determined by the individual’s 
observed characteristics xi and unobserved characteristics ui. If unobservables have no effect on the 
probability of participation in irrigation, then γ = 0. If unobservables do affect the probability of 
participation (γ ≠ 0), then individuals i and j with the same observable characteristics have different 
probabilities of selecting into program participation. Using a logistic distributional assumption, we can 
derive the odds ratio that an individual participates in the irrigation scheme (Rosenbaum 2002):  
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If matching is properly implemented, differences in observed characteristics are removed from 
the equation and there is no effect of unobservables on impact estimates due to selection bias. If there are 
differences in unobserved variables (ui - uj between individuals or if unobserved variables have a nonzero 
probability (γ ≠ 0) of influencing selection, then estimates are likely to be biased. By using sensitivity 
analysis, we can estimate the effect of variation in γ on the impact estimates, providing some evidence 
about the validity of the assumptions on which the nonexperimental estimates are based.  
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4.  EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Before presenting the main results of the paper, the results from the estimation of propensity scores from 
the probit regression that estimates the likelihood of a household adopting irrigation are presented in 
Table 4. A rich set of covariates—including individual, household, and village variables—is used to 
estimate this relationship, which satisfies the balancing property and which has sufficient overlap of the 
common support between the distribution of propensity scores for irrigators and nonirrigators. Using 
these covariate estimates, propensity scores are constructed to ensure matching on these observable 
characteristics of households in both the treatment and comparison groups. 
Table 4. Determinants of irrigation access 
  Irrigation 
  (1 = yes) 
Number of females > 17 in household  -0.053 
  (0.083) 
Number of males > 17 in household  0.127* 
  (0.072) 
Number of children < 17 in household  -0.001 
  (0.068) 
Ln farm assets in FCFA  0.112* 
  (0.057) 
Ln total hectares cultivated  -0.096** 
  (0.049) 
Head’s education (1 = yes)  0.809* 
  (0.424) 
Spouse’s education (1 = yes)  0.437 
  (0.678) 
Ln household size  -0.165 
  (0.449) 
Ln household durable assets in FCFA  0.174*** 
  (0.055) 
Ln age of household head  0.098 
  (0.255) 
Peulh ethnicity (1 = yes)  -0.703*** 
  (0.186) 
Road access within village  -0.583*** 
  (0.187) 
Road access within 1–10 kilometers of village  -0.947*** 
  (0.164) 
Constant  -2.724** 
  (1.268) 
Number of observations  428 
Data source: Author’s calculations from the Poverty and Food Security Household Survey in Northern Mali, 2006 and IFPRI 
(1998). 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p < 0.01. ** p < 0.05. * p < 0.1. 
The results of the ATT estimates on production per hectare, consumption per capita, and 
agricultural income are presented first for irrigators relative to nonirrigating agricultural households in 
Table 5, whereas Table 7 presents the results disaggregated by large- and small-scale irrigators. 
Consistent across both sets of results is that irrigation has a significant effect on household production per  
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hectare. In Table 5, ATT estimates across nearest-neighbor, kernel, and local linear matching estimators 
yield a statistically significant estimate between 1.96 and 2.1 metric tons per hectare for irrigated 
households. Measuring production using agricultural income produces estimates that vary between 
125,600 and 132,469 FCFA. Irrigated households also have higher statistically significant consumption 
per capita with estimates between 40,113 and 49,877 FCFA. Despite employing different estimators, 
point estimates of the impact of irrigation do not vary substantially between estimators. 
Table 5. Average treatment effects on the treated—All irrigation types 





neighbors  Kernel 
Local linear 
matching 
Production (kilograms) per hectare  2,014  2,101  1,972  1,964 
  (590)***  (470)***  (468)***  (505)*** 
Annualized per capita consumption (FCFA)  49,877  42,525  40,113  44,403 
  (16,219)***  (12,577)***  (12,514)***  (13,877)*** 
Agricultural income (all crops)  125,600  131,406  127,991  132,469 
  (43,102)***  (31,584)***  (31,301)***  (34,579)*** 
N   425  425  425  425 
Data source: Author’s calculations from the Poverty and Food Security Household Survey in Northern Mali, 2006 and IFPRI 
(1998). 
Notes: The number of observations to estimate the average treatment effect on the treated households (ATT) will not be the same 
as the number of observations in the dataset, as we trim 5 percent of the observations on both tails of the distribution and impose 
that matches are made along the common support of the distribution of irrigators’ and nonirrigators’ propensity scores. All 
standard errors were bootstrapped with 1,000 replications. *** p < 0.01. ** p < 0.05. * p < 0.1. 
To explore the sensitivity of these estimates to unobservables, Rosenbaum bounds are estimated 
for the kernel estimates. Table 6 shows the results. By increasing the size of gamma, we can estimate the 
upper bound significance level of the point estimate and the confidence interval if we scale the influence 
of the unobservables on the point estimates. Both point estimates of the measures of production 
(production per hectare and agricultural income) are insensitive to doubling the effect of unobservables on 
the point estimates at the 10-percent level of statistical significance. However, the consumption per capita 
estimates are sensitive to increases in gamma. This suggests that irrigation has a strong effect on 
production, but its implications for consumption per capita may be driven by alternative unobservables, 
such as market integration, individual ability, or the management of irrigation schemes that could affect 
the costs to the household. Unobservable factors such as market integration or increased irrigation costs 
would be reflected in lower per capita consumption, but not necessarily in agricultural production. 
Table 6. Rosenbaum bounds of kernel impact estimates—All irrigation types 







  Upper bound 
significance 
level  Confidence interval 
  Upper bound 
significance 
level  Confidence interval 
1  0.00  714  1,441    0.00  7,838  40,647    0.00  71,983  139,209 
2  0.01  56  2,628    0.91  -22,779  88,212    0.01  7,653  229,337 
3  0.47  -288  3,675    1  -38,767  118,289    0.37  -25,169  285,299 
4  0.94  -514  4,537    1  -48,684  139,213    0.87  -46,672  325,034 
5  1.00  -682  5,239    1  -55,626  155,602    0.99  -62,129  352,917 
Data source: Author’s calculations from the Poverty and Food Security Household  Survey in Northern Mali, 2006 and IFPRI 
(1998).  
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In Table 7, differences in ATT estimates between large- and small-scale irrigators relative to 
nonirrigating agricultural households are assessed. Small-scale irrigation yields a statistically significant 
impact estimate of 2.1–2.4 metric tons per hectare, whereas large-scale irrigation has a point estimate of 
941 kilograms to 1.1 metric tons per hectare. With respect to agricultural income, estimates of the effect 
of small-scale irrigation were also generally higher, with estimates between 133,283 FCFA and 142,527 
FCFA. Estimates of the effect of large-scale irrigation ranged from 112,774 FCFA to 153,811 FCFA and 
were more variable than those of small-scale irrigation. The upper bound of the large-scale irrigation 
point estimate on agricultural income is derived from the single nearest-neighbor estimator. Point 
estimates estimated with the other three estimators including the 10 nearest neighbors, kernel, and local 
linear matching may be more precise due to the differences in estimators noted earlier. In Table 8, we 
investigate the sensitivity of these results for both subsamples of data using the Rosenbaum bounds. Both 
large- and small-scale production per hectare and agricultural income estimates are robust to doubling the 
level of unobservables at the 10-percent level of statistical significance. 
Estimates of the effect of small-scale irrigation on consumption per capita are less precise than in 
the pooled estimates including all irrigators. No statistically significant effects on consumption per capita 
were estimated. These consumption estimates are also not robust to increases in the level of 
unobservables (Table 8). However, we find significant effects of large-scale irrigation on consumption 
per capita. Point estimates of the effect of large-scale irrigation on consumption per capita range between 
135,483 FCFA and 154,840 FCFA. These estimates of impact on consumption per capita are larger than 
the overall contribution of household income due to agricultural production. This suggests that one of the 
spillover effects of access to large-scale irrigation may be the investment of agricultural surplus in 
nonfarm activities and the development of labor markets for agricultural and nonagricultural employment 
that results from larger population concentrations. 
Although the point estimates for small-scale irrigators suggest no effect of irrigation on 
consumption, this set of estimates differs from point estimates of the effect of small-scale irrigation on 
consumption found in Dillon (2008), who finds similar effects on agricultural production, but statistically 
significant effects on consumption. Dillon (2008) uses a difference-in-differences estimator with a small 
panel of small-scale irrigators over a nine-year period in the same area of Mali. Due to those results, the 
effects on consumption found here should be interpreted with caution, for two reasons. First, the panel 
data are likely to produce a more precise point estimate than the cross-section of data because panel data 
estimate control for household fixed effects. Second, consumption variables are likely influenced by 
different types of unobservables that are more difficult to account for in cross-sections, namely the effect 
of market integration and labor market opportunities that may differ across villages where large- and 
small-scale projects are installed. For example, more remote villages with fewer market opportunities 
may not have nonfarm investment opportunities to reinvest agricultural surpluses.  
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Table 7. Average treatment effects on the treated, by small and large irrigation types 





neighbors  Kernel 
Local linear 




neighbors  Kernel 
Local linear 
matching 
Production (kilograms) per hectare  2,442  2,096  2,126  2,248    1,097  1,080  941  971 
  (770)***  (614)***  (591)***  (638)***    (580)*  (403)***  (373)**  (408)** 
Annualized per capita consumption in FCFA  5,826  8,059  10,545  12,216    154,253  150,459  135,483  154,840 
  (18,750)  (14,217)  (13,857)  (15,163)    (31,879)***  (23,530)***  (23,455)***  (25,864)*** 
Agricultural income (all crops)  140,247  133,283  142,148  142,527    153,811  122,720  125,507  112,774 
  (48,243)***  (37,200)***  (37,717)***  (41,874)***    (62,968)**  (40,060)***  (40,962)***  (47,131)** 
N   378  378  378  378    244  244  244  244 
Data source:  Author’s calculations from the Poverty and Food Security Household Survey in Northern Mali, 2006 and IFPRI (1998). 
Notes: The number of observations to estimate the average treatment effect on the treated households (ATT) will not be the same as the number of observations in the dataset, as 
we trim 5 percent of the observations on both tails of the distribution and impose that matches are made along the common support of the distribution of irrigators’ and 
nonirrigators’ propensity scores. All standard errors were bootstrapped with 1,000 replications. *** p < 0.01. ** p < 0.05. * p < 0.1. 
 
Table 8. Rosenbaum bounds of kernel impact estimates, by small and large irrigation types 
    Agricultural production    Consumption per capita    Agricultural income (FCFA) 
Type  Gamma 
Upper bound 
significance level  Confidence interval 
  Upper bound 
significance level  Confidence interval 




Small irrigators  1  0.00  810  1,777    0.77  -19,253  9,958    0.00  78,651  166,001 
  2  0.03  -29  3,163    1.00  -45,158  47,848    0.01  9,919  264,164 
  3  0.57  -438  4,142    1.00  -58,426  76,039    0.27  -25,986  319,872 
  4  0.95  -702  4,939    1.00  -67,656  98,301    0.74  -51,302  355,991 
  5  1.00  -926  5,646    1.00  -75,017  114,827    0.95  -70,769  386,659 
Large irrigators  1  0.00  231  1,153    0.00  86,223  173,572    0.00  50,640  167,476 
  2  0.09  -136  1,971    0.00  42,648  226,890    0.02  3,307  257,542 
  3  0.37  -303  2,550    0.01  15,263  262,887    0.13  -25,041  307,596 
  4  0.66  -435  3,105    0.03  -4,701  292,241    0.31  -42,792  343,019 
  5  0.84  -595  3,852    0.07  -21,136  315,660    0.50  -57,314  376,679 
Data source: Author’s calculations from the Poverty and Food Security Household Survey in Northern Mali, 2006 and IFPRI (1998).   
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5.  CONCLUSION 
This paper provides evidence about the impact of irrigation projects, which differs according to the scale 
of the project. Whereas trends in investment have tended toward smaller-scale investment due to 
coordination problems in larger-scale irrigation schemes, the direct impacts on household production, 
consumption, and income differentiated by the scale of the project are not well established. Lipton, 
Litchfield, and Faurès (2003) identify several pathways through which scale may potentially lead to 
differential impacts on households, including gains in efficiency, higher degrees of market integration in 
both output and input markets, and spillovers of agricultural knowledge among farmers. 
The propensity score matching used to estimate impact controls for observable village and 
household characteristics between households in different irrigation schemes to increase the quality of 
matches among agricultural households with similar initial characteristics. After controlling for household 
and village characteristics that may influence outcomes for households, the analysis shows substantial 
gains in agricultural production and agricultural income for both large- and small-scale irrigation, with 
substantially larger benefits accruing to small-scale irrigators. However, our results on the effects of 
irrigation on consumption per capita are mixed. Whereas our results show an overall positive effect of 
consumption per capita on irrigators in comparison with nonirrigators, the effects of large-scale irrigation 
on consumption per capita are larger than those estimated with the subsample of small-scale irrigators. 
This suggests that the dynamics of adoption between the two types of irrigation schemes require more 
attention in future research. Ravallion and Chen (2005) estimate a large income effect of projects without 
corresponding increases in consumption per capita for development projects in China. They attribute this 
to the time horizon of the project as villagers may view certain development projects as a transitory 
income shock rather than a shift in permanent income. This may also be the case among irrigators if 
smaller-scale village irrigation projects are perceived as less durable over time. However, the differences 
in income and consumption effects on the two types of irrigation projects may also be a result of less 
market integration in small-scale irrigators’ communities in comparison with markets in large-scale 
irrigators’ communities. Agricultural surpluses may affect household welfare more slowly among small-
scale irrigators if asset, input, and food markets are less integrated.  
It cannot be ruled out that these results may also be biased by household or individual 
unobservable characteristics, although the agricultural production and income impact estimates are robust 
to doubling the level of unobservables in the calculated Rosenbaum bounds. Evaluation methodologies, 
such as randomized experiments, instrumental variable methods (for example, Duflo and Pande 2007), 
regression discontinuity (Lee and Lemieux 2010), or structural estimation (Heckman 2010) provide 
interesting alternatives to propensity score matching. A priori, these methods have their own noted 
econometric advantages and drawbacks, which continue to generate considerable debate,
7 but methods 
must also be matched to data and the development intervention to be evaluated. In the case of evaluating 
differences between large-scale irrigation and small-scale irrigation projects, it was difficult to identify a 
sufficient set of instruments that would identify both types of projects, as allocation of projects at the 
community level was predicated on geographic proximity to water as well as donor funding and priorities. 
Data limitations and program design precluded the use of structural estimation or a regression 
discontinuity approach.
8
Notwithstanding these significant methodological debates in the evaluation literature, the debate 
on the appropriate scale for irrigation investments has important policy implications as well as significant 
unanswered questions for future research. On the research front, there is greater need for panel datasets 
that observe both small- and large-scale irrigators over time to better understand the dynamics of 
 Further, it is unclear whether these methods would remove concerns about the 
role of unobservable characteristics on impact estimates.  
                                                       
7 See, for example, Deaton (2010), who critiques a reliance on randomized evaluations, the debate between Heckman (1997, 
2010) and Angrist and Imbens (1999), and Imbens (2010) on the use of IV methods,  
8 Pretreatment characteristics would also potentially improve the quality of propensity score matches in the paper’s analysis, 
but the programs included in this analysis did not field baseline surveys.  
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irrigation and provide the opportunity to employ econometric techniques to control for household or 
individual fixed effects. Our results provide some evidence that small-scale irrigators have higher 
agricultural production and income. However, the debate with respect to scale may be overly simplistic. 
The results in this paper do not give an unequivocal response in the case of northern Mali, nor are the 
projects in northern Mali likely to be identical to those in other countries. More evidence in other 
countries is necessary to build the evidence base. In many countries, both types of investments are 
necessary, depending on land and water resource availability, crop types, community organization, and 
targeting for poverty reduction. Small-scale and large-scale irrigation schemes have large effects on 
production, but the organization of the scheme will affect the level and distribution of household 
agricultural surpluses. This coincides with previous findings by Rosegrant and Perez (1997). Further, the 
costs of investing in irrigation projects differ by scale. Inocencio et al. (2007) review costs of large- and 
medium-scale projects and find that construction costs were almost twice as large in Sub-Saharan African 
schemes when compared with other irrigation schemes in other parts of the world. A better understanding 
of the mechanisms through which the scale of irrigation affects benefits and costs in future research can 
increase its efficiency and impact on household welfare.  
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